Telecommunications and Networking Services

Integrated Backbone Trust Model

1. Organizations receiving IP packets from the Integrated Backbone can trust the source subnet/area address, if that packet originated from within PSU.
2. IP packets originating outside of PSU cannot be made to appear as though they originated within PSU.
3. IP packets traversing the Integrated Backbone cannot be viewed or modified. (TNS may monitor traffic as part of maintenance activities.)
4. All local and improperly addressed non-local traffic cannot pass a local network's Integrated Backbone demarcation point.
5. Properly addressed packets entering the Integrated Backbone will be delivered to the proper destination subnet/area if within Penn State and to the proper external network if the destination is outside of Penn State.

Achieved By

1. Physical and logical demarcation point between TNS Integrated Backbone components and customers components.
2. IP source filtering at Integrated Backbone demarcation point.
3. All shared transport (used by more than one administrative authority) that is not part of a local network is under the control of TNS.
4. All Integrated Backbone hub locations are in TNS secured locations.
5. IP routing information is only accepted from networks for those same networks and this information is only exchanged at the demarcation point.
6. Broadcast packets cannot traverse the Integrated Backbone in broadcast form.

• General Information
• Cable Television
• Integrated Backbone
• Local Area Network (LAN)
• Networking
• Satellite
• Videoconferencing
• Voice Systems
• Cable/Wiring

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• Integrated Backbone Connection Design Request